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Abstract
The classical stable marriage problem asks for a matching between a
set of men and a set of women with no blocking pairs, which are pairs
formed by a man and a woman who would both prefer switching from their
current status to be paired up together. When both men and women have
strict preferences over the opposite group, all stable matchings have the
same cardinality, and the famous Gale-Shapley algorithm can be used to
find one. Differently, if we allow ties in the preference lists, finding a
stable matching of maximum cardinality is an NP-hard problem, already
when the ties are one-sided, that is, they appear only in the preferences of
one group. For this reason, many researchers have focused on developing
approximation algorithm for this problem.
In this paper, we give a refined analysis of an approximation algorithm
given by Huang and Telikepalli (IPCO’14) for the stable marriage problem
with one-sided ties, which shows an improved 13
9
-approximation factor for
the problem. Interestingly, our analysis is tight.
1 Introduction
The stable marriage problem is one of the most classical and famous algorithmic
game theory problems. We are here given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E),
where, according to the widely used terminology, A represents a set of men,
and B represents a set of women. Each individual a ∈ A (resp. b ∈ B) is
adjacent to a subset N(a) ⊆ B (resp. N(b) ⊆ A) of individuals, representing
the subset of people (s)he would accept to be matched to. Furthermore, each
c ∈ A ∪ B has strict preferences over the individuals in N(c). The goal is to
compute a stable matching M , that is a matching which does not contain a
blocking pair. Formally, a blocking pair (a, b) for a matching M is given by
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two individuals a ∈ A and b ∈ B with (a, b) ∈ E \M , such that a is either
unmatched in M or he prefers b to his current partner, and similarly b is either
unmatched in M or she prefers a to his current partner. Intuitively, if there
exists a blocking pair (a, b) for a given matching M , then both a and b have
an incentive to deviate from their current status, making the matching M be
an unstable outcome. The seminal work of Gale and Shapley [2] shows that a
stable matching always exists, and gives an elegant polynomial-time algorithm
to find one. Since then, stable matchings have been extensively studied in the
literature, and many beautiful properties are known about their structure. In
particular, all stable matchings in a graph have the same cardinality [3].
The situation becomes significantly different when the preferences among
individuals are not strict anymore, and we allow ties. In fact, in the presence of
ties, stable matchings can have different cardinalities, and computing a stable
matching of maximum size is NP-hard (in fact, APX-hard) [8, 13, 6]. Due to the
importance of finding stable matchings of large size in many real-world applica-
tions, it is not surprising that many researchers in the algorithmic community
have focused on developing approximation algorithms for the stable marriage
problem with ties [10, 9, 7, 5, 15, 14, 6].
A special case which received a lot of attention, is the stable marriage with
one-sided ties, i.e., where only one group (say, the women) are allowed to have
ties in their preferences over the opposite group. This setting finds many appli-
cations in real-world instances, such as in the Scottish Foundation Allocation
Scheme (SFAS) (we refer to [12] for details). For this case, Kiraly [9] gave a
3
2
-approximation bound, later improved to a 25
17
-approximation bound by Iwama
et al. [7]. Huang and Telikepalli [5] developed a new algorithm and showed that
their algorithm achieves the approximation factor at most 22
15
. Subsequently,
Radnai [16] showed that the algorithm of Huang and Telikepalli [5] has approx-
imation factor at most 41
28
. Dean and Jalasutram [1] improved the analysis of
the algorithm proposed by Iwama et al. [7] to 19
13
, and this has been the best
known approximation factor for the problem until recently.
From an hardness point of view, the strongest bounds are given in [4], which
showed that the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties is NP-hard to
approximate within a factor of 21
19
, and strengthened the bound to 5
4
assuming
Unique Game Conjecture.
Our results and techniques. In this paper, we give a refined analysis of the
algorithm of Huang and Telikepalli [5], which shows that the algorithm is indeed
a 13
9
-approximation algorithm for the problem. Note that the factor 13
9
≈ 1.444
is strictly better than the factor 19
13
≈ 1.461 given in [1].
An interesting feature of the combinatorial algorithm of [5] is that, differently
from the classical Gale-Shapley procedure, each man can make two proposals
and each woman can accept two proposals. When men stop proposing, the set
of accepted proposals yields a graph G′ where each individual can have degree
up to 2, and the matching M output by the algorithm will be a maximum
cardinality matching in G′ which satisfies some additional properties.
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Given a stable matchingM output by their algorithm and a stable matching
OPT of maximum cardinality, the idea of [5] for proving the approximation
bound is the following. They consider theM -augmenting paths in the symmetric
difference (M ⊕ OPT) of M and OPT. It is not difficult to show that M -
augmenting paths of size 3 (i.e. with 3 edges) cannot exist, if the algorithm
is executed properly. However, there could be an augmenting path of size 5
or larger. In particular, augmenting paths of size 5 are problematic, since for
such paths the ratio between the number of the edges in OPT and M is 3/2,
and therefore exceeds the claimed approximation bound. Huang and Telikepalli
[5] are able to charge each augmenting path of size 5 to some component of
M ⊕ OPT of a larger size. The crux of the analysis lies in defining a map
between augmenting paths of size 5, and large components of M ⊕ OPT, such
that each large component does not get charged too many times. In order
to define this map, they study the structure of an auxiliary directed graph H
which is obtained from G′ by orienting its edges and contracting some edges of
M which belong to 5-augmenting paths.
Our improvement is based on defining a better mapping between augmenting
paths of size 5, and large components of M ⊕ OPT. In order to do this, we
construct a slightly different auxiliary directed graph H , where we contract
more edges of M (not just the ones in 5-augmenting paths as is done in [5]).
We study the structure of this new graph, and introduce two crucial concepts:
popular women, and jumps. In particular, jumps are central to our refined
charging scheme, and together with the concept of popular women, we are able
to provide a better analysis of the algorithm.
Interestingly, an example by Radnai [16] shows that our analysis is tight.
For the sake of completeness, also in this paper we report an instance where
the algorithm effectively computes a solution which is away from the optimal
one by a factor of 13
9
. This shows that our charging scheme is essentially best
possible, and modifications in the algorithm are necessary in order to further
improve the approximation bound.
Remark: Very recently, Lam and Plaxton [11] have posted online a paper show-
ing a ln(4) ≈ 1.386 algorithm for the problem. This is achieved by improving
the algorithm and technique of [7] and [1]. The work of Lam and Plaxton [11]
was done indipendently from our work. Though their factor is strictly better
than ours, their algorithm involves solving an LP, while the algorithm of Huang
and Telikepalli [5], that we use here, is a purely combinatorial algorithm, which
is one of the nicest aspects of it. Therefore our result is of independent interest.
2 Algorithm by Huang and Telikepalli
First, let us describe the algorithm by Huang and Telikepalli [5]. A stable
matching is computed in two phases. In the first phase, which is the proposal
phase, men (in arbitrary order) make proposals to women, while women accept
or reject proposals. It is important to highlight that at any point of time each
men can simultaneously make up to two proposals, and women are allowed
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to accept up to two proposals. This phase stops when all men stop making
proposals. Subsequently, one computes a maximum cardinality matching with
some properties in the graph induced by all the accepted proposals. In this
graph, every node can have degree at most two (since both men and women are
allowed to make/accept up to two proposals). We describe the process in more
details in the next paragraphs.
How men propose.
Each man a ∈ A has two proposals p1a and p
2
a. Initially, both p
1
a and p
2
a are
offered to the first woman on a’s list. If a proposal pia, i = 1, 2 is rejected by the
k-th woman on a’s list, then the proposal pia goes to the (k + 1)-st woman on
a’s list; in case the k-th woman is the last woman on a’s list, then the proposal
pia goes again to the first woman on a’s list.
At each moment of the algorithm every man has one of the following three
statuses: basic, 1-promoted and 2-promoted. Each man a ∈ A starts as a
basic man. If each woman in N(a) at least once rejected any proposal of a,
the man a becomes 1-promoted. If afterwards each woman in N(a) at least
once rejected any proposal of a as a 1-promoted man, the man a becomes 2-
promoted. Finally, if each woman in N(a) at least once rejected any proposal
of a as a 2-promoted man, the man a stops making proposals.
How women accept proposals.
A woman b, who gets a proposal from a man a, always accepts the current
proposal of a if at the moment b holds at most one proposal, excluding the
current proposal of a. Otherwise, if b holds already two proposals when she
receives the proposal of a, then b rejects a least desirable proposal among
these three (see Definition 1), and keeps the other two (if more than one proposal
among the ones considered satisfies Definition 1, ties are broken arbitrarily).
Definition 1. For a woman b, proposal pia is superior to p
i′
a′ if one of the
following is true
• b prefers a to a′.
• b is indifferent between a and a′; a is currently 2-promoted while a′ is not
2-promoted.
• b is indifferent between a and a′; a is currently 1-promoted while a′ is
basic.
• b is indifferent between a and a′; a and a′ are basic; moreover, woman b
has already rejected a proposal of a while b did not reject any proposal of
a′.
A proposal pia is a least desirable proposal among a set of proposals that a
woman b has, if it is not superior to any of the proposals in the set.
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What is the output matching.
Let G′ be the bipartite (simple) graph with the node set A ∪ B and the edge
set E′, where E′ consists of the edges (a, b), a ∈ A and b ∈ B such that at the
end of the algorithm b holds at least one proposal of a. Clearly, the degree of
a node in G′ is at most two, since each man has at most two proposals and
each woman has at most two proposals accepted at each time point. Let M be
a maximum cardinality matching in G′, where all degree two nodes of G′ are
matched. In [5], it was shown that the matching M is a stable matching in the
graph G.
Useful properties and notations.
Let OPT be a maximum cardinality stable matching in G. Then M ⊕ OPT
consists of paths and cycles. We will say that a path is an augmenting path
in M ⊕ OPT if it is augmenting with respect to M . Unless explicitly stated
otherwise, a man a ∈ A is called basic, 1-promoted and 2-promoted if after
the end of the algorithm a is basic, 1-promoted or 2-promoted, respectively. A
man a ∈ A is called promoted if a is either 1-promoted or 2-promoted.
The following two lemmas are from [5], and give some useful properties of
augmenting paths inM⊕OPT. For the completeness sake we provide the proofs
of these two lemmas in Appendix.
Lemma 1 ([5]). There is no 3-augmenting path in M ⊕ OPT.
Lemma 2 ([5]). Let α0 − β0 − α1 − β1 − α2 − β2 be a 5-augmenting path in
M ⊕ OPT, where αi ∈ A, βi ∈ B for i = 0, 1, 2, then
• α0 is a 2-promoted man and has been rejected by β0 as a 2-promoted man.
• α2 is basic and α2 prefers β1 to β2.
• α1 is not 2-promoted and α1 prefers β1 to β0.
• β1 is indifferent between α1 and α2.
• In G′, β0 has degree 1 if and only if α1 has degree 1.
• In G′, β1 has degree 1 if and only if α2 has degree 1.
Further in the paper, we use ≤, ≥, >, <, ≃ to indicate preferences. For
example, a >b c stands for b strictly prefers a to c. For a node a in G, M(a) and
OPT(a) stand for the node matched with a by M and OPT, respectively. If a is
not matched by M or OPT, we define M(a) and OPT(a) to be ∅, respectively.
3 Tight Analysis
As in [5], we will now construct a digraphH , starting fromG′, which will be used
for our charging scheme. First, we orient all edges in the graph G′ from men to
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women. Second, for each augmenting path of the form α0−β0−α1−· · ·−αk−βk
with αi ∈ A and βi ∈ B for all i = 0, 1, . . . , k, we contract the edge (α1, β0)
into a single node (we call the resulting node an x-node) and we contract the
edge (αk, βk−1) into a single node (we call the resulting node a y-node). Note
that this second step in the construction of the graph H is different from the
construction in [5], which is based only on augmenting paths of length 5. We
refer to the x- and y-nodes of H as red; and to the other nodes of H as blue.
For every node v ∈ V (G′), let [v] ∈ V (H) be the corresponding (possibly an x-
or a y-) node in H . We say that a node v ∈ V (G′) is in an x-node or in a
y-node if [v] is an x-node or a y-node, respectively. A crucial concept is that
of critical arcs and good paths, defined below.
Definition 2. An arc ([a], [b]) in H with a ∈ A and b ∈ B, is called critical if
all statements below hold
• b ≥a OPT(a).
• a is not 2-promoted.
• (a, b) /∈M .
• [a] is not a y-node.
Definition 3. A (directed) path in H is called good if it starts with a blue man,
ends with a blue woman, and no edge of the path is in M .
We now state a lemma which gives certain properties of the graph H . These
properties are analogous to the properties proven in [5]. However, since our
definition ofH and our definition of a critical arc is different from the definitions
in [5], we provide a proof of this lemma in Appendix.
Lemma 3. The graph H satisfies the following statements.
(a) There is no arc from a y-node to an x-node.
(b) No critical arc starts at a y-node and no critical arc ends at an x-node.
(c) Every critical arc is contained in some good path.
(d) Every good path has at most one critical arc.
(e) Every two distinct good paths are node-disjoint.
Popularity
In order to obtain a better charging scheme, we here introduce the concept of
popular women. This concept plays a key role later in our analysis.
Definition 4. At a given time point, a proposal from c ∈ A to b ∈ B is a-good
(for a ∈ A) if c ≥b a, and at least one of the following is true
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• c is promoted at the given time point
• c was rejected by b before the given time point
• c >b a.
Definition 5. For a ∈ A and b ∈ B, b is a-popular if at the end of the
algorithm b holds two a-good proposals.
The following lemma is a straightforward observation.
Lemma 4. Let a, c ∈ A and b ∈ B be such that a ≥b c. If b is a-popular then b
is c-popular as well.
The next lemmas will be useful later.
Lemma 5. For a ∈ A and b ∈ B, the number of a-good proposals which b holds
does not decrease over time. Furthermore, if b is not a-popular, b rejected a at
most one time.
Proof. First, note that a proposal from c ∈ A to b ∈ B that is not a-good for
some a ∈ A at some point in time, can become a-good at some later point in
time. For example, this can happen when c becomes promoted. However, once
a proposal becomes a-good, it will remain so until the end of the algorithm. To
complete the proof of the first statement, it remains to show that at no point
in time b rejects an a-good proposal for a not a-good proposal. Let us assume
the contrary, i.e. that at some point in time b ∈ B rejects an a-good proposal
from c ∈ A for a not a-good proposal from d ∈ A. We have c ≥b a and a ≥b d,
since the proposal from c is a-good and the proposal from d is not. We also
have d ≥b c, since b rejects the proposal of c for the proposal from d. Thus, we
have a ≃b c ≃b d. Moreover, since the proposal from d is not a-good, d is not
promoted and was not rejected by b before the given time point. However, since
b rejects the proposal from c for the proposal from d, at this time point c is also
neither promoted nor was rejected by b before. Hence, the proposal from c is
not a-good, contradiction.
For the second statement, note that if b ∈ B rejects a ∈ A once, then all
subsequent proposals of a to b are a-good. Thus, due to the above argumen-
tation, if at some time point b rejects a for the second time, then at that time
point b holds two a-good proposals. Hence, at the end of the algorithm b holds
two a-good proposals as well, i.e. b is a-popular.
Lemma 6. Let a ∈ A be basic, then the less preferred neighbor of a in G′ is
not a-popular.
Proof. Let b ∈ B be the less preferred neighbor of a in G′. It is sufficient to show
that at the end of the algorithm, b holds a proposal that is not a-good. Note, b
did not reject a at any time point. Moreover, since a is basic, any proposal of
a to b is not a-good.
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Definition 6. For a woman b ∈ B, a critical arc ([a], [c]) is next to b if (a, b)
is in OPT.
Lemma 7. If α0−β0−α1−β1−α2−β2 is a 5-augmenting path and β1 is not
α1-popular, then there is a critical arc next to β1.
Proof. Let us assume that for all b ∈ B such that (α1, b) is an arc in G
′, we
have β1 >α1 b. Then β1 rejected α1 at least twice, contradicting Lemma 5.
Thus, there exists b ∈ B such that (α1, b) is an arc in G
′, we have b ≥α1
β1 = OPT(α1). Let us prove that ([α1], [b]) is a critical arc in H . By Lemma 2,
α1 is not 2-promoted and β1 >α1 β0 =M(α1). Clearly, [α1] is not a y-node and
(α1, b) 6∈M , proving that ([α1], [b]) is a critical arc in H .
Jumps
The second concept that will be central for our improved analysis, is that of
jumps. We start with introducing matching jumps. Each such jump defines
a map from a woman, which is not isolated in G′ but is not matched by M , to
a uniquely defined woman, which is matched by M .
Definition 7. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated
node in G′. Then there exists c ∈ B such that b and c are end nodes of a
maximal (not directed) path in G′. Let us define mjump(b) := c.
Remark 1. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated node
in G′. Then b has degree 1 in the graph G′. Thus there is a unique maximal (not
directed) path in G′ such that b is an end node of this path. By the construction
of M , the other end node of this path is some woman c ∈ B who is matched by
M .
Let us prove that for two different women b, c ∈ B their matching jumps
cannot result in the same woman, whenever matching jumps are well defined
for b and c.
Lemma 8. Let b, c ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b and c are not isolated
nodes in G′. If mjump(b) = mjump(c), then b = c.
Proof. Note that b and mjump(b) are two end nodes of the same maximal (not
directed) path in G′. Similarly, c and mjump(c) are two end nodes of the same
maximal (not directed) path in G′. Since maximal (not directed) paths in the
graph G′ are disjoint and mjump(b) = mjump(c), we have b = c.
Lemma 9. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated node
in G′. Then, the node mjump(b) is either a blue woman in the graph H or is in
a y-node.
Proof. It is enough to show that mjump(b) is not in an x-node. Note that if a
woman c ∈ B is in an x-node, then this woman holds two proposals at the end
of the algorithm. Thus, c either has degree 2 in the graph G′ or (c,M(c)) forms
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a connected component of G′ (that is, both two proposals held by c are from
M(c)). However, by the definition mjump(b) is an end node of a maximal (not
directed) path in G′, where one of the end nodes is a woman not matched by
M , contradiction.
As follows from the above lemma, a matching jump can result in a blue node
or in a y-node. However, for reasons to become clear later, we would like jumps
to map to a blue woman. Sometimes a matching jump indeed ends in a y-node.
In such cases, the next type of jumps, path jumps, helps to do a further jump
to a uniquely defined blue woman.
Definition 8. Let c be a y-node or an end node of a critical arc in H, let b
be a blue woman such that there is a directed path in H from c to b. Then
pathjump(c) := b.
Remark 2. Note that if a node c in H is in a critical arc, then pathjump(c) is
uniquely defined, and pathjump(c) is the end node of the good path containing c.
Moreover, pathjump(c) is also uniquely defined for [c], whenever [c] is a y-
node with an outgoing arc. If c has no outgoing arc, then there is no blue woman
b such that there is a directed path in H from c to b.
Finally, we introduce a mapmatching jump with exception, which com-
bines the previous two jumps.
Definition 9. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated
node in G′. If mjump(b) is a blue woman, let
mjumpexc(b) := mjump(b) .
If mjump(b) is in a y-node, let
mjumpexc(b) := pathjump([mjump(b)]) .
Remark 3. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated node
in G′. If mjump(b) is in a y-node, then this y-node [mjump(b)] has an outgoing
arc.
Lemma 10. Let b ∈ B be not matched by M , such that b is not an isolated
node in G′. Then mjumpexc(b) is a blue woman.
Proof. If mjump(b) is a blue woman, then mjumpexc(b) = mjump(b) and hence
mjumpexc(b) is a blue woman as well. Otherwise mjump(b) is in a y-node, then
mjumpexc(b) = pathjump([mjump(b)])
and pathjump([mjump(b)]) is a blue woman by definition.
Lemma 11. Let b ∈ B be a woman such that b is not matched by M and b
is in a good path (so b is not isolated in G′). If mjump(b) is in a y-node, then
mjumpexc(b) has degree 2 in G′.
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Proof. Suppose mjumpexc(b) does not have degree 2 in G′. Then the degree of
mjumpexc(b) in G′ equals 1, since all nodes in G′ have degree at most 2 and the
node mjumpexc(b) is clearly not isolated.
Since b is not matched byM , the degree of b in G′ is at most 1. Moreover, the
degree of b in G′ equals 1, because b is contained in a good path in the graph H .
Hence, there exists a unique maximal (not directed) path in G′ with an end node
b. The other end node of this path is mjump(b). Note that pathjump([mjump(b)])
is a node on this path. Since pathjump([mjump(b)]) = mjumpexc(b) has degree 1
in the graph G′, the node mjumpexc(b) is also an end node of this path. Thus,
we have that either mjump(b) = mjumpexc(b) or b = mjumpexc(b). By definition
mjumpexc(b) is a blue node and by the statement of the lemma mjump(b) is in
a y-node, implying b = mjumpexc(b).
By definition, there exists a directed path in the graph H from the node
[mjump(b)] to the node pathjump(mjump(b)). Thus, on one side [mjump(b)] is
in the good path in H containing the node b. On the other side, by definition
[mjump(b)] has no incoming arc in the graphH . However, no good path contains
a y-node with no incoming arcs, contradiction.
Corollary 1. Let b ∈ B be a woman such that b is not matched by M and b is
in a good path (so b is not isolated in G′). Then mjumpexc(b) is matched by M .
Proof. If mjumpexc(b) = mjump(b), then by definition mjumpexc(b) is matched
by M . If mjump(b) is in a y-node, then by Lemma 11 mjumpexc(b) has degree 2
in the graph G′, and hence by definition of M the node b is matched by M .
Lemma 12. Let b, c ∈ B be women such that b, c are not matched by M and
both b and c are in some good path (so neither b or c is isolated in G′). If
mjumpexc(b) = mjumpexc(c), then b = c.
Proof. Since all nodes in G′ have degree at most 2 and mjumpexc(b) is not
isolated in G′, the degree of mjumpexc(b) in the graph G′ is either 1 or 2.
Let us assume that the degree of mjumpexc(b) in the graph G′ is 1. Then by
Lemma 11, neither mjump(b) nor mjump(c) is a y-node. Thus,
mjump(b) = mjumpexc(b) = mjumpexc(c) = mjump(c) ,
that by Lemma 8 implies b = c.
Now, let us assume that the degree of mjumpexc(b) in the graph G′ is 2.
Since both mjump(b) and mjump(c) have degree 1 in G′, we have
mjump(b) 6= mjumpexc(b) mjump(c) 6= mjumpexc(c) ,
implying that both mjump(b) and mjump(c) are in y-nodes with no incoming
arcs in H . Thus, from both [mjump(b)] and [mjump(c)] there is a directed path
to the node mjumpexc(b) = mjumpexc(c) in the graph H , where all nodes in
the path except mjumpexc(b) are y-nodes. On the other hand, mjumpexc(b)
is a blue woman in H , and hence there is at most one arc from a y-node to
mjumpexc(b). Moreover, for every y-node there is at most one incoming arc,
10
implying mjump(b) = mjump(c). So in this case, we also obtain b = c by
Lemma 8.
The next lemma is used to guarantee that at certain stages of our charging
scheme the same nodes do not get charged multiple times.
Lemma 13. Let a, c ∈ A and b, d ∈ B be such that the arcs ([a], [b]) and ([c], [d])
are critical. If pathjump([a]) = pathjump([c]), then we have a = c.
Proof. By Lemma 3, both ([a], [b]) and ([c], [d]) are contained in some good
paths. Moreover, pathjump([a]) and pathjump([c]) are the end nodes of those
good paths. Since by Lemma 3 good paths are node-disjoint, ([a], [b]) and
([c], [d]) are in the same good path. Moreover, since by Lemma 3 every good
path has at most one critical arc, we have ([a], [b]) = ([c], [d]), in particular
a = c.
4 Charging scheme
To show the tight approximation guarantee of the algorithm in [5], we use the
following charging scheme. The charging scheme is conducted in five stages,
which are described below.
1. Each man who is in a y-node from a 5-augmenting path receives a charge
of 1.
2. Each man with a nonzero charge passes on his charge to his less preferred
neighbor in G′.
3. Every woman b ∈ B with a nonzero charge and who is not matched byM ,
passes all her charge to mjump(b). (Note that if a woman has a nonzero
charge at the beginning of this stage, then she is not isolated in G′, and
hence this step is well defined.)
4. Each woman b ∈ B, such that there is a critical arc (a, c) next to b,
passes on all her charge to pathjump(a). (Note that pathjump(a) equals
pathjump(c).)
5. Each woman b ∈ B, who received a nonzero charge in stage 4 and who is
not matched by M , passes on all her charge to mjumpexc(b). (Note that
if a woman received charge at stage 4, then she is not isolated in G′, and
hence this stage is well defined.)
We call the charge a woman received at stages 2 and 3 unpopularity-
charge and call the charge a woman received at stages 4 and 5 path-charge.
If a woman receives charge at stages 2 and 3, but passes on that charge at stage
4, we say that this woman has zero unpopularity-charge.
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Lemma 14. At the end of the charging scheme, only women matched by M
have a nonzero charge.
Proof. From the charging scheme, it is clear that only women may have a
nonzero charge at the end of the charging scheme.
Let us discuss how a woman c ∈ B, who is not matched by M , may receive
a nonzero charge during the charging scheme. First, c cannot receive a nonzero
charge in stage 1. Second, if c receives a charge at stage 2, then c passes on this
charge at stage 3. Third, note that for every b ∈ B which is not matched by M
and is not isolated in G′, mjump(b) is matched by M . Hence, c cannot receive
any charge at stage 3. Forth, if c receives a charge at stage 4, then c passes this
charge on at stage 5. Fifth, by Corollary 1 and Lemma 3 no woman, which is
not matched by M , gets a nonzero charge at stage 5.
Lemma 15. At the end of the charging scheme, only blue women have a nonzero
path-charge.
Proof. Note that pathjump(b) is a blue woman for every b ∈ B that passes on
her charge at stage 4. Thus, only blue women can receive a nonzero charge at
stage 4.
For every b ∈ B that passes on her charge at stage 5, mjumpexc(b) is a blue
woman by Lemma 10. Thus, only blue women can receive a nonzero charge at
stage 5.
Lemma 16. At the end of the charging scheme, no woman in an x-node has a
nonzero unpopularity-charge.
Proof. Let us assume that there exists a woman c ∈ B, who is in an x-node
and holds a nonzero unpopularity-charge at the end of the charging scheme. By
Lemma 3, in G′ the node c is adjacent to no man in a y-node. Thus, c does not
receive any charge at stage 2.
Thus, c received a nonzero charge at stage 3. So c is an end node of a (not
directed non trivial) maximal path in G′, where both end nodes are distinct
women. However, since c is in an x-node then either c has degree 2 in G′ or
(c,M(c)) forms a connected component of G′, contradiction.
Lemma 17. At the end of the charging scheme, no woman in a 5-augmenting
path has a nonzero charge.
Proof. Let α0 − β0 − α1 − β1 − α2 − β2 be a 5-augmenting path, where α0, α1,
α2 ∈ A and β0, β1, β2 ∈ B.
First, β2 is not matched by M and thus has no charge at the end of the
charging scheme by Lemma 14.
Second, β0 has no unpopularity-charge by Lemma 16 and no path-charge by
Lemma 15, since β0 is in an x-node.
Finally, β1 also has no path-charge by Lemma 15, since β1 is in a y-node.
To finish the proof, it remains to show that at the end of the charging scheme
β1 has no unpopularity-charge.
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Let us assume that β1 receives a nonzero unpopularity charge at stage 3.
Then β1 = mjump(b) for some b ∈ B, where b is not matched by M and is not
isolated in G′. Thus, β1 is the end node of a maximal (not directed) path in G
′
containing at least two distinct women. However, the degree of β1 in G
′ equals
the degree of α2 in G
′ by Lemma 2, and so β1 cannot be the end node of a
maximal (not directed) path in H ′ containing at least two distinct women.
Let us assume that β1 receives a nonzero unpopularity charge at stage 2.
Thus there exists a ∈ A, such that a is in a y-node and β1 is the less preferred
neighbor of a in G′. Since a is in a y-node, a is basic and hence β1 is not
a-popular by Lemma 6.
Since a is in a y-node, OPT(a) is not matched by M and β1 ≥a OPT(a).
Note that β1 is distinct from OPT(a), since β1 is matched by M , implying
β1 >a OPT(a). Thus, we have α1 ≥β1 a, because otherwise OPT is not a stable
matching in G. By Lemma 4, α1 ≥β1 a implies that β1 is not α1-popular.
Hence, by Lemma 7 there is a critical arc next to β1 and so β1 passes on her
unpopularity-charge at stage 4.
Lemma 18. After stages 2 and 3, every woman has a charge of at most 2.
Furthermore, after stages 2 and 3, each woman, who is not matched by M with
a man from a 5-augmenting path, has a charge of at most 1.
Proof. Every woman has at most 2 neighbors in G′. Thus, each woman has a
charge of at most 2 after stage 2.
Let us assume that a woman c ∈ B receives a charge at stage 3 passed from
some woman b ∈ B. Then, both b and c are the end nodes of a maximal (not
directed) path in G′. Hence, both b and c have degree 1 in G′, and thus both b
and c have a charge of at most 1 after stage 2. So after stage 3, c has a charge
of at most 2.
Let us show the second part of the statement. If c is a woman not matched
by M , then it is straightforward to see that c receives a charge of at most 1 at
stage 2 and receives no charge at stage 3. Now, suppose that (a, c) ∈ M for
some a ∈ A and c ∈ B, where a is not in a 5-augmenting path. Thus, a has a
charge of zero after stage 1. Hence, after stage 2 c has a charge of at most 1. If
c receives a nonzero charge at stage 3, then c is an end node of a maximal (not
directed) path in G′, and hence has degree 1 in G′, showing that c has a charge
of 0 after stage 2 and a charge of 1 after stage 3.
Lemma 19. After the end of the charging scheme, every woman has a path-
charge of at most 2.
Proof. The plan of the proof is as follows. First, we prove that no woman
receives a nonzero charge at both stage 4 and stage 5. Then we prove that
every woman receives charge of at most 2 at stage 4, and finally we prove that
every woman receives a charge of at most 2 at stage 5.
Let us suppose there was a woman c ∈ B who receives a nonzero charge
both at stage 4 and stage 5. Since c receives charge at stage 4, c is an endpoint
of a good path in H . Since c receives charge at stage 5, there exists b ∈ B
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such that b is not matched by M and such that mjumpexc(b) = c. Since c is
matched by M and c is the end node of a good path, c has degree 2 in G′.
Hence, c 6= mjump(b). Since c = mjumpexc(b), we have that mjump(b) is in a
y-node, which has no incoming arc in H . Moreover, there is a path in H from
[mjump(b)] to c, where all nodes except c are y-nodes. Note that every y-node
has at most one incoming arc in H and that c has at most one incoming arc
from a y-node. Thus, [mjump(b)] is in the good path containing c. However, no
good path has a y-node with no incoming arc, contradiction.
Let us assume that a woman c ∈ B gets a charge passed on from a woman
b ∈ B at stage 4. Thus, there is a critical arc ([a], [d]), a ∈ A, d ∈ B next to b,
where pathjump([a]) = c. By Lemma 13, there is at most one such critical arc
([a], [d]). Also, since a =M(b) there exists at most one woman b who passes on
her charge to c at stage 4. By Lemma 18, such b has a charge of at most 2 after
stage 3, showing that c receives a charge of at most 2 at stage 4.
Let us assume that a woman c ∈ B gets a nonzero charge passed on from
a woman b ∈ B at stage 5, where mjumpexc(b) = c. Then b is not matched by
M , and hence b has no charge after stage 3. By Lemma 3, b is in some good
path in the graph H , because b received a nonzero charge at stage 4. Hence,
by Lemma 12 there is at most one such woman b who passes her charge to c at
stage 5. Since b has no charge after stage 3 and receives a charge of at most 2
after stage 4, we know that c receives a charge of at most 2 at stage 5.
Lemma 20. At the end of the charging scheme, every woman has a charge of
at most 3.
Proof. Let c ∈ B be some woman. If c is not matched by M , the charge of c is
zero at the end of the charging scheme by Lemma 14. If c is in a 5-augmenting
path, the charge of c is zero at the end by Lemma 17.
So we may assume that c is matched by M , but is not in a 5-augmenting
path. Let a ∈ A be the man such that a = M(c). Obviously, a is not in a
5-augmenting path. Thus, by Lemma 18 c has an unpopularity-charge of at
most 1 at the end of the charging scheme. By Lemma 19, c has a path-charge
of at most 2 at the end, so the total charge of c is at most 3.
Theorem 1. Let α0 − β0 − · · · − αk − βk be an augmenting path of length at
least 7, where αi ∈ A and βi ∈ B, i = 0, 1, . . . , k. Then there is a woman βi,
i = 1, . . . , k − 1 who has zero unpopularity-charge at the end of the charging
scheme.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let us assume that for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the woman
βi has a nonzero unpopularity-charge at the end of the algorithm.
For the proof we need the following definition. For i = 1, . . . , k, we say that
the man αi is pointing left if αi prefers βi−1 to βi; otherwise we say that αi
is pointing right.
Claim 1. There is i = 1, . . . , k − 1, such that αi is pointing right. Moreover,
αk is pointing left.
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Proof. First, suppose for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, the man αi is pointing left.
In particular, α1 is pointing left, i.e. β0 >α1 β1. Hence, we also have
α0 ≥β0 α1, since otherwise (β0, α1) is a blocking pair for OPT. Note, that α0
is 2-promoted and has degree 1 in G′, so β0 rejected α0 as a 2-promoted man.
Because α0 ≥β0 α1 and (α1, β0) is in G
′, the man α1 is 2-promoted as well.
Furthermore, α2 is also pointing left, i.e. β1 >α2 β2. Hence, we also have
α1 ≥β1 α2, since otherwise (β1, α2) is a blocking pair for OPT. Since α1 is 2-
promoted, β1 rejected α1 as a 1-promoted man. Because α1 ≥β1 α2 and (α2, β1)
is in G′, we have that the man α2 is promoted.
By the statement of the theorem, β1 has a nonzero unpopularity-charge.
Since during the algorithm β1 rejected α1, the woman β1 has 2 proposals at the
end of the algorithm. Hence, β1 is not an end node of a maximal (not directed)
path in G′ containing at least two distinct women, and thus β1 did not receive
any unpopularity-charge at stage 3 of the charging scheme.
Thus, β1 received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 2. Let a ∈ A be
the man who passed on his charge to β1 at stage 2. Because a is in a y-node,
a is basic at the end of the algorithm. Since α1 and α2 are promoted, we know
that a is different from α1 and from α2. Since (a, β1) is an edge in G
′ and
(α1, β1) is not in G
′ even though α1 is promoted and a is basic, we have that
a >β1 α1 = OPT(β1). On the other hand, since a is in a y-node, we have that
β1 >a OPT(a), showing that (a, β1) is a blocking edge for OPT, contradiction.
Finally, let us show that αk is pointing left. Note that βk is not matched by
M . Thus, if αk is pointing right, the edge (αk, βk) is blocking for M , contradic-
tion.
By Claim 1, there exists αt, t = 1, . . . , k − 1, such that αt is pointing to the
right and αt+1 is pointing to the left. Let us fix such t. Note that αt ≃βt αt+1,
because otherwise either (αt, βt) is blocking for M or (αt+1, βt) is blocking for
OPT.
Claim 2. The woman βt is not αt-popular.
Proof. By the assumption βt has a nonzero unpopularity-charge. Now, let us
assume that βt received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 3. Then βt has
one proposal at the end of the algorithm, implying that βt is not αt-popular.
Now, let us assume that βt received a nonzero unpopularity-charge at stage 2.
Let a ∈ A be the man who passed on a nonzero charge to βt at stage 2. Since
a is in a y-node and (a, βt) is in G
′, we have βt >a OPT(a). Thus, we have
αt ≥βt a, because otherwise (a, βt) is a blocking pair for OPT. Since βt is the
less preferred neighbor of a in G′, βt is not a-popular by Lemma 6. Furthermore,
αt ≥βt a and Lemma 4, imply that βt is not αt-popular.
The next claim shows that there is a critical arc next to βt. Thus, βt passes
on all of her charge at stage 4, and so βt does not have any unpopularity-charge
at the end of the charging scheme, finishing the proof of the theorem.
Claim 3. There is a critical arc next to βt.
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Proof. Since βt is not αt-popular, by Lemma 5 βt rejected αt at most once.
Thus, there is b ∈ B such that (αt, b) is an edge in G
′ and b ≥αt βt = OPT(αt).
Recall, that αt is pointing right, i.e. βt >αt βt−1, so b 6= βt−1 = M(αt).
Obviously, αt is not in a y-node, so (αt, b) is a critical arc next to βt.
Lemma 21. At the end of the charging scheme, the sum of charges of all women
in a (2ℓ+ 5)-augmenting path is at most 3ℓ .
Proof. Note that a (2ℓ + 5)-augmenting path has ℓ + 3 women. If ℓ = 0, the
statement follows by Lemma 17. So we may assume ℓ ≥ 1.
The sum of the path-charges is at most 2ℓ. Indeed, the last woman has a
zero path-charge by Lemma 14. The first woman and second-to-last woman
both have a zero path-charge by Lemma 15, since they are not blue women.
Each of the remaining ℓ women has a path-charge of at most 2 by Lemma 19.
The sum of the unpopularity-charges is at most ℓ. Indeed, the last woman
has a zero unpopularity-charge by Lemma 14. The first woman has a zero
unpopularity-charge by Lemma 16. By Theorem 1, there exists a woman, who
is not the first woman nor the last woman and who has a zero unpopularity-
charge. None of the remaining ℓ women is matched by M with a man from a
5-augmenting path. Hence, each of the remaining ℓ women has an unpopularity-
charge of at most 1 by Lemma 18. Thus, the sum of charges of all women in
the augmenting path is at most 3ℓ.
Theorem 2. The algorithm in [5] (described for the sake of completeness in
Section 2) is a 13
9
-approximation algorithm.
Proof. Let Q′ be the set of all components ofM ∪OPT. For each q ∈ Q′, choose
ℓq such that:
• If q is an augmenting path, q has 2ℓq + 5 edges.
• If q is a cycle or an even (non-augmenting) alternating path, q has 2ℓq
edges.
• If q is an odd (non-augmenting) alternating path, q has 2ℓq − 1 edges.
Let t be the number of 5-augmenting paths and let k be the number of
augmenting paths in M ⊕ OPT which have at least 7 edges. Let us also define
ℓΣ := Σq∈Q′ℓq.
Claim 4. We have t ≤ 3ℓΣ and k ≤ ℓΣ.
Proof. Note that at the beginning of the charging scheme the sum of all charges
equals t. Thus, to prove that t ≤ 3ℓΣ it is enough to show that the sum of all
charges is at most 3ℓΣ at the end of the charging scheme.
We will prove that for every q ∈ Q′, the sum of the charges of the nodes
in q is at most 3ℓq. If q is an odd (non-augmenting) alternating path or an
alternating cycle, then q has at most ℓq women. Thus, the statement follows
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by Lemma 20. Similarly, if q is an even (non-augmenting) alternating path, the
statement follows by Lemma 14 and Lemma 20. If q is an augmenting path, the
statement follows directly from Lemma 21.
Finally, we have ℓΣ ≥ k, because there are k augmenting paths with at least
7 edges and ℓq ≥ 1 for every such augmenting path q.
Claim 5. We have |M | ≥ ℓΣ + 2(t+ k) and |OPT| ≤ ℓΣ + 3(t+ k).
Proof. First, M has at least ℓΣ+2(t+k) edges, since each cycle and each (non-
augmenting) alternating path q ∈ Q′ has ℓq edges in M and each augmenting
path q ∈ Q′ has ℓq + 2 edges in M .
Second, OPT has at most ℓΣ + 3(t + k) edges, since each cycle and each
(non-augmenting) alternating path q ∈ Q′ has at most ℓq edges in OPT and
each augmenting path q ∈ Q′ has ℓq + 3 edges.
Thus, we have
|OPT|
|M |
≤
ℓΣ + 3(t+ k)
ℓΣ + 2(t+ k)
=
13
9
+
−4ℓΣ + (t+ k)
9(ℓΣ + 2(t+ k))
≤
13
9
+
−4ℓΣ + 3ℓΣ + ℓΣ
9(ℓΣ + 2(t+ k))
=
13
9
,
where the first inequality follows from Claim 5 and the second inequality follows
from Claim 4 and from the fact that the denominator is non negative.
For the sake of completeness, we give a proof that our analysis of the algo-
rithm by Huang and Telikepalli [5] is tight. The next theorem follows from the
example provided by Radnai [16] (Section 3.6.1).
Theorem 3. The bound in Theorem 2 is tight.
Proof. The instance in Figure 1 shows that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight. In
Figure 1, the circle nodes represent men and the square nodes represent women.
The dashed lines represent the edges in OPT, the solid lines represent the edges
in G′, where the horizontal solid lines represent the edges in M . The arrow tips
indicate the preferences of each person. For example, b30 has two tips arrows
pointing to a22 and a
3
1 and one tip arrow pointing to a
3
0, so b
3
0 is indifferent
between a22 and a
3
1 and prefers both to a
3
0.
It is straightforward to check that OPT is stable. Clearly, M is a maximum
matching in G′. We see that |M | = 9 and |OPT| = 13.
Let us verify that M is indeed a matching output by the algorithm in [5].
For this it is enough to show, that the graph G′ can be obtained in the following
run of the algorithm:
• a12 proposes to b
1
1 twice; b
1
1 accepts twice.
• a23 proposes to b
1
1 twice; b
1
1 rejects his first proposal; for his second proposal,
b11 rejects one of a
1
2’s proposals.
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a10 b
1
0
a11 b
1
1
a12 b
1
2
a20 b
2
0
a21 b
2
1
a22
b22 a
2
3
b23
a30 b
3
0 a
3
1
b31 a
3
2 b
3
2
a40 b
4
0 a
4
1
b41 a
4
2
b42
Figure 1: An instance for which the algorithm in [5] outputs a stable matching
M with |M | = 9
13
OPT
• a22 proposes to b
2
1 twice; b
2
1 accepts twice.
• a31 proposes to b
2
1 twice; b
2
1 rejects his first proposal; for his second proposal,
b21 rejects one of a
2
2’s proposals.
• a32 proposes to b
4
1 twice; b
4
1 accepts twice.
• a42 proposes to b
4
1 twice; b
4
1 rejects his first proposal; for his second proposal,
b41 rejects one of a
3
2’s proposals.
• a12 proposes to b
2
2; b
2
2 accepts.
• a23 proposes to b
2
2; b
2
2 accepts.
• a32 proposes to b
3
1; b
3
1 accepts.
• a42 proposes to b
3
1; b
3
1 accepts.
• a22 proposes to b
2
2; b
2
2 chooses arbitrarily to reject a
2
2.
• a31 proposes to b
3
1; b
3
1 chooses arbitrarily to reject a
3
1.
• a22 proposes to b
3
0; b
3
0 accepts.
• a31 proposes to b
3
0; b
3
0 accepts.
• a11 proposes to b
1
1 twice; b
1
1 arbitrarily chooses to reject him twice.
• a11 proposes to b
1
0 twice; b
1
0 accepts twice.
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• a21 proposes to b
2
1 twice; b
2
1 arbitrarily chooses to reject a
2
1 twice.
• a21 proposes to b
2
0 twice; b
2
0 accepts twice.
• a41 proposes to b
4
1 twice; b
4
1 arbitrarily chooses to reject a
4
1 twice.
• a41 proposes to b
4
0 twice; b
4
0 accepts twice.
• a10 proposes to b
1
0 several times; b
1
0 rejects him until a
1
0 gives up.
• a20 proposes to b
2
0 several times; b
2
0 rejects him until a
2
0 gives up.
• a30 proposes to b
3
0 several times; b
3
0 rejects him until a
3
0 gives up.
• a40 proposes to b
4
0 several times; b
4
0 rejects him until a
4
0 gives up.
Note that in this example, all men are either basic at the end of the algo-
rithm, or are always rejected during the algorithm (even as 2-promoted men).
This means that simply adding more levels of promotion would not increase the
algorithm’s worst-case performance.
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5 Appendix
Proofs from Section 3
Proof of Lemma 1. Let α0−β0−α1−β1 be a 3-augmenting path in M ⊕OPT,
where α0, α1 ∈ A and β0, β1 ∈ B. Since α0 is not matched by M , α0 is 2-
promoted. Since β1 is not matched by M , α1 is basic. Moreover, α1 prefers β0
to β1, since otherwise M has a blocking pair (α1, β1). Since α1 is basic, α0 is
2-promoted and at the end of the algorithm β0 has a proposal from α1, we have
that β0 prefers α1 to α0, showing that OPT has a blocking pair (α1, β0).
Proof of Lemma 2. First, α0 is not matched in M and hence only one proposal
of α0 is accepted at the end of the algorithm. Hence, α0 is 2-promoted and α0
was rejected by β0 as a 2-promoted man.
Second, β2 is not matched by M and hence α2 was never rejected by β2.
Thus, α2 is basic. Moreover, α2 prefers β1 to β2, since otherwise M has a
blocking pair (α2, β2).
Let us prove the first part of the third statement. If α1 is 2-promoted, then
α1 was rejected by β1 as a 1-promoted man. Since at the end of the algorithm
β1 has a proposal of the basic man α2, then β1 prefers α2 to α1. However, then
(α2, β1) is a blocking pair for OPT, contradiction.
Let us now prove the second part of the third statement. If α1 prefers β0
to β1, then β0 does not prefer α1 to α0, since otherwise (α1, β0) is a blocking
pair for OPT. Thus, either β0 prefers α0 to α1 or β0 is indifferent between α0
and α1. In both cases, it is impossible at the end of the algorithm to have the
situation when β0 has a proposal of α1, while α0 has at most one his proposal
accepted, α0 is 2-promoted and α1 is not 2-promoted.
The forth statement follows from the fact that α2 prefers β1 to β2 and α1
prefers β1 to β0. Thus, if β1 is not indifferent between α1 and α2, then either
OPT or M is not stable.
For the fifth and sixth statements, it is enough to note that at the end of
the algorithm α1 and α2 have both of their proposals accepted, while β0 and β1
hold two proposals.
Proof of Lemma 3(a). Suppose there is such an arc, say an arc ([a], [b]), a ∈ A,
b ∈ B. Since a is in a y-node, OPT(a) is not matched by M . Thus, a was never
rejected by OPT(a). Hence, a is basic and a prefers b over OPT(a).
Since b is in an x-node, OPT(b) is not matched by M . Thus, OPT(b) is 2-
promoted. Moreover, b prefers a over OPT(b), since b accepted a basic proposal
of a while rejecting a 2-promoted proposal of OPT(b). This implies that (a, b)
is a blocking edge for the stable matching OPT, contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3(b). Due to the definition of a critical arc, no critical arc starts
at a y-node. Let us show that no critical arc ends at an x-node. Suppose there
is a critical arc ([a], [b]), a ∈ A, b ∈ B such that b is in an x-node.
Since b is in an x-node, OPT(b) is not matched by M , and hence OPT(b) is
2-promoted. Moreover, by the definition of a critical arc, a is not 2-promoted.
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Thus, b prefers a over OPT(b), since b accepted a not-2-promoted proposal of a
while rejecting a 2-promoted proposal of OPT(b).
By the definition of a critical arc, b ≥a OPT(a). Note that b is not equal
to OPT(a), because OPT(b) is 2-promoted and a is not 2-promoted. Hence, a
prefers b over OPT(a). This implies that (a, b) is a blocking edge for the stable
matching OPT, contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 3(c). Before showing that every critical arc is contained in
some good path, let us make some observations about x-nodes and y-nodes
in the graph H .
In the graph H , every y-node is either isolated or has an outgoing arc in H :
If the y-node consists of a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then a is basic and hence at the
end of the algorithm both his proposals are accepted. If these two proposals are
accepted by the same woman, namely b, then the y-node is isolated. Otherwise,
the y-node has an outgoing arc.
Similarly, every x-node is either isolated or has an incoming arc. Indeed,
if the x-node consists of a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then b rejected OPT(b) at least
once, and hence at the end of the algorithm b holds two proposals. If these two
proposals are both from the same man, namely a, then the x-node is isolated.
Otherwise, the x-node has an incoming arc.
Now, let us consider a critical arc ([a], [b]), a ∈ A, b ∈ B in the graph H .
Let us construct a good path in H by constructing a subpath from [b] to a blue
woman and a subpath from a blue man to [a]. If [b] is a blue woman, then the
subpath from [b] to a blue woman is a trivial path. Otherwise, [b] is a [y]-node,
since by Lemma 3(b), [b] is not an x-node. Note that [b] is not isolated and thus
[b] has an outgoing arc. Moreover, by Lemma 3(a) this outgoing arc is leading
to either a blue woman or a y-node. In case this arc leads to a blue woman, we
stop, otherwise we continue until we reach a blue woman in H .
We construct analogously a subpath from a blue man to [a]. From the
construction it is clear that the path is a good path.
Proof of Lemma 3(d). Note that all the internal nodes of a good path must be
x- or y-nodes. To see this, assume that c is an internal blue node of a good
path. Then, c is incident to two distinct edges in H , none of which is in M ,
contradicting the assumption thatM matches all degree two nodes in the graph
H . The statement then follows from Lemma 3(b) and Lemma 3(c).
Proof of Lemma 3(e). First, note that two distinct good paths cannot have com-
mon end nodes. Let us assume that c is a common end node of two distinct
good paths. So c is incident to two distinct edges in H , none of which is in M ,
contradicting the assumption thatM matches all degree two nodes in the graph
H .
Now recall that all nodes in H have degree at most 2. If two distinct good
paths have a common internal node, since the end nodes are different, then
necessarily there is a node with degree 3 in H , a contradiction.
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